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Abstract: In the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008, the greatest economic 
disaster since the Great Depression, the cover story of the July 18th 2009 issue of The 
Economist, entitled “What went wrong with economics,” opened with an unequivocally 
incriminating statement: “Of all the economic bubbles that have been pricked, few have 
burst more spectacularly than the reputation of economics itself.” In the months 
surrounding this indictment, many influential economists, including several Nobel 
laureates, were drawn to the same embarrassing conclusion. Despite the existence of a 
handful of Cassandras, economists, as a group, had failed to foresee the crash. This 
short essay reviews the criticisms addressed to modern economic theory in the 
immediate aftermath of the crash. Overall, a case can be made for the fact that 
economists have been blinded to the possibility that we live in an uncertain and 
complex world, and have forgotten much of the relevant insights to be found in the 
history of their discipline. If economics is to be reformed, theoretical and 
methodological pluralism should be promoted, and changes in the institutional structure 
of discipline need to be made. 
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Introduction1 
In the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008, the greatest economic disaster since 
the Great Depression, the cover story of the July 18th 2009 issue of The Economist, 
entitled “What went wrong with economics,” opened with an unequivocally 
incriminating statement: “Of all the economic bubbles that have been pricked, few have 
burst more spectacularly than the reputation of economics itself.” In the months 
surrounding this indictment, many influential economists, including several Nobel 
laureates, were drawn to the same embarrassing conclusion (Acemoglu, 2009; 
Buchanan, 2009; Colander et al., 2009; Hodgson, 2009; Krugman, 2009a; Shiller, 2009; 
Skidelsky, 2009a; Stiglitz, 2009). Despite the existence of a handful of Cassandras, 
economists, as a group, had failed to foresee the crash. The reason, critics have argued, 
is that the possibility of asset bubbles was not really taken into account in today’s 
dominant approaches to macroeconomics and finance that assume that capital markets 
work perfectly well.  
Given recent events, some champions of market self-regulation, such as Alan 
Greenspan or Richard Posner, were forced to admit that something was wrong. 
Greenspan, once the world’s most powerful banker, who had warned of the market’s 
“irrational exuberance” but had done nothing to stop the dot.com bubble, testified 
before the U.S. Congress that he was “very distressed” by the fact that there may be a 
                                                 
1 We are grateful to John Davis, Zohreh Emami and Geoffrey Hodgson. 
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“flaw” in the prevailing economic theory,2 while Posner (2009: xii) self-critically 
admitted that deregulation in the finance industry had been based on an exaggerated 
belief in the “self-healing powers” of markets. As governments around the world 
devised stimulus plans to kick-start their economies, the confidence expressed by Nobel 
laureate and pioneer of modern macroeconomics Robert Lucas (2003: 1), that “the 
problem of depression prevention has been solved,” seemed difficult to share.  
In this short essay, we review the criticisms addressed to modern economic 
theory. Overall, a case can be made for the fact that economists have been blinded to the 
possibility that we live in an uncertain and complex world, and have forgotten much of 
the relevant insights to be found in the history of their discipline. If economics is to be 
reformed, theoretical and methodological pluralism should be promoted, and changes in 
the institutional structure of discipline need to be made.  
The Return of Depression Economics 
In his testimony at the Congressional hearings on Building a Science of Economics for 
the Real World, held exactly a year after the official indictment of economic theory by 
The Economist, Nobel laureate Robert Solow (2010: 13) lamented the fact that modern 
macroeconomics, the bulk of which is built on dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
(DSGE) models, has essentially “nothing useful to say about anti-recession policy,” and 
                                                 
2  See “Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation,” New York Times, 24 October 2008.  
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hence nothing useful to say about the current predicament.3 Not surprisingly, several 
authors have argued that the “return of depression economics” (Krugman, 2009b) 
should be taken as a cue to rehabilitate Keynesian policies and ideas (Akerlof and 
Shiller, 2009; Davidson, 2009; Lawson, 2009; Leijonhufvud, 2009; Skidelsky, 2009b; 
Keen, 2010; Mankiw, 2010; Ormerod, 2010; Frydman and Goldberg, 2011; Hodgson, 
2011a).4 An important idea that economists need to come to terms with is the notion of 
uncertainty that has been forgotten by the profession (Hodgson, 2011b).  
For John Maynard Keynes (1936), like for Frank Knight (1921) before him, 
uncertainty refers to situations where it is impossible to calculate any form of 
probability distribution of future events. In these instances, “we simply do not know” 
(Keynes, 1937: 214). The pervasiveness of these situations in real-world economies, 
and their key role in the booms and busts of capitalism, are ignored in current 
macroeconomic models in which agents form systematically correct rational 
expectations.5 The main reason is expressed by Lucas (1977: 15) himself: “[i]n cases of 
uncertainty, economic reasoning will be of no value.” In other words, for Lucas and 
                                                 
3  Edward Prescott (2002: 1), another Nobel laureate and pioneer of real business cycle theory – the 
core of modern macroeconomics – admits that DSGE models offer “little guidance to policy except for 
the important policy implication that a [discretionary] stabilization effort will have either no effect or a 
perverse effect.”  
4  Posner (2009) and Bartlett (2009), both historically anti-Keynesian figures, belong to this group.  
5  This assumes that people have a complete understanding of the mechanisms governing the 
economy. It is precisely on this basis that Lucas, Prescott, and others, dismissed Keynesian fiscal policies 
(Lucas, 1976; Kydland and Prescott, 1977).  
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many other economists, uncertainty undermines the principle of rational choice, and this 
impairs the economist’s capacity to predict human behaviour. The rhetoric of 
prediction, popularized by Milton Friedman’s (1953) “methodology of positive 
economics,” has prevented the economics profession from acknowledging that we live 
in an “unpredictable world of complexity” (Hodgson, 2011b: 166).  
The Unpredictable World of Complexity 
To say that the DSGE models currently used by academics and central banks fall short 
of real-world complexity is an understatement. Two interrelated lines of criticism have 
accordingly been levelled at modern economic theory (Colander et al., 2008; LeBaron 
and Tesfatsion, 2008; Colander et al., 2009; Lawson, 2009; Caballero, 2010; Colander, 
2010; Kirman, 2010; Hodgson, 2011a; Leijonhufvud, 2011). The first problem, as 
David Colander, Alan Kirman, and others have argued, stems from the conceptual 
reductionism involved in the use of a fully rational Robinson Crusoe-type representative 
agent. This has prevented macroeconomists from taking into account actual linkages, 
networks, and interactions between actual human beings, who not only have limited 
cognitive abilities but are also necessarily heterogeneous in terms of motives, 
information, knowledge, and capabilities. Arguably, as Tony Lawson, Geoffrey 
Hodgson or Axel Leijonhufvud have emphasized, portraying the economy as a “closed” 
system rather than the “open” system that it really is, is equally problematic.    
Since openness implies at least some indeterminateness, prediction and 
mathematical elegance may need to be sacrificed in favour of causal explanation 
(Hodgson, 2011a). However, notwithstanding Paul Krugman’s (2009a) claim that 
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economists were partly to blame in the crisis because, as a profession, they “mistook 
beauty, clad in impressive-looking mathematics, for truth,” there can be little argument 
that tackling the real-world complexity of the economy cannot be done without 
mathematics. Although some concern about the excessive formalization of the 
discipline has been expressed, critics of modern economic theory generally do not deny 
this.6 In fact, a much more sophisticated mathematics than that used in today’s DSGE 
models will be needed: the new techniques that economic modellers need to embrace 
involve heterogeneous agent-based simulations and nonlinear dynamics (Colander et 
al., 2009; Colander, 2010; Hodgson, 2011a; Leijonhufvud; 2011). This means that new 
generations of economists will need to be trained accordingly. 
The Importance of History 
Training in new and better models is certainly needed, but models alone will not prevent 
future crises. Nor will they provide adequate policy advice if they are built by “idiot 
savants, skilled in technique but innocent of real economic issues” (Krueger, 1991: 
1044-1045). Part of the profession’s failure is imputable to the lack of training and 
interest in both economic history and the history of economic thought (Hodgson, 2009; 
Earl, 2010; Mirowski, 2010; Shiller, 2010; Colander, 2011).7 Larry Summers, the 
                                                 
6  Lawson’s (2009: 760) rejection of “mathematical deductivist modelling per se” is the exception 
that proves the rule. 
7  Barry Eichengreen explains “why economics needs history” in an interview with Perry Mehrling, 
22 July 2011. See http://ineteconomics.org/video/30-ways-be-economist/barry-eichengreen-why-
economics-needs-history (accessed 23 July 2011).  
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brilliant Harvard economist who in his capacity as U.S. Secretary of the Treasury 
sponsored deregulation in the banking and derivatives industries, recently observed that 
the works best dealing with today’s financial crisis are those of Walter Baghehot, 
Hyman Minsky, and Charles Kindleberger, but acknowledged that these names are 
absent in the typical graduate education in economics.8 Quite a lot of relevant 
economics was simply forgotten by the profession (Acemoglu, 2009; Goodhart, 2010; 
DeLong, 2011; Krugman, 2011; Stiglitz, 2011).  
It is difficult to overstate the contrast between the research cited by Summers and 
the dominant belief in the efficiency of capital markets. Much of modern financial 
economics, based on Eugene Fama’s (1970) “efficient market hypothesis,” holds that 
stock prices fully reflect all available information, and that deviations from an asset’s 
intrinsic value cannot last for long. This means, as Fama himself recently explained, 
that the notion of bubble is meaningless.9 The manifest existence of devastating 
speculative bubbles, that more often than not burst with dramatic consequences for the 
real economy, clearly signals a problem with this view, and points to the need for more 
realistic models (Schneider and Kirchgässner, 2009; Thaler, 2009; Kirman, 2010; 
Zingales, 2010; Frydman and Goldberg, 2011; Krugman, 2011). The well-documented 
fact that bubbles have a recurring pattern throughout history (Kindleberger, 1978; 
                                                 
8  Interview with Martin Wolf, 8 April 2011. See http://ineteconomics.org/videobretton-
woods/larry-summers-and-martin-wolf-new-economic-thinking at 7′49″ onwards (accessed 22 July 
2011). 
9  Interview with John Cassidy, New Yorker, 13 January 2010. See 
http://www.newyorker.com/online/ blogs/johncassidy/2010/01/interview-with-eugene-fama.html 
(accessed 20 July 2011).  
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Minsky, 1982; Galbraith, 1990; Shiller, 2000; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009) needs to play 
a greater role in the education of financial economists, macroeconomists, and regulators 
alike.  
The Institutional Structure of Economics 
Unfortunately, prevailing disciplinary boundaries often discourage economists from 
importing insights from relevant contiguous disciplines, such as psychology, sociology, 
political science, philosophy, history, and law (Earl, 2010; Shiller, 2010; Hodgson, 
2011a).10 Despite the proliferation of cross-discipline fields, most excursions of 
economists outside of economics are literally extensions of Econ 101 to others fields 
following the example of Gary Becker. As Harold Demsetz (1997), Edward Lazear 
(2000), and others have argued, economics is simply more “scientific,” and this justifies 
its primacy. The current situation has painfully revealed, however, that “economists 
have no clothes” (Buchanan, 2009). Rather than pretending to have superior knowledge 
and methods, the time has perhaps come to more humbly take Bruno Frey’s (1993: 102) 
                                                 
10 Keynes (cited in Hodgson, 2011a: 194) famously pointed out that the “master-economist” must 
be, in some degree, a mathematician, a historian, a statesman, and a philosopher; indeed, “no part of a 
man’s nature or his institutions must lie entirely outside his regard.” Similarly, in a 1978 interview, 
Friedrich Hayek observed that “an economist who is only an economist cannot be a good economist.” See 
http://www.hayek.ufm.edu/ index.php/Leo_Rosten_Part_I at 49′37″ (accessed 20 July 2011).  
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call “to embark on a new course and to switch from an exporter to an importer of ideas” 
seriously.11  
This implies that the incentive structure within which researchers evolve needs to 
be revised. This is by no means an easy task, but it is clear that unless the institutions 
change, economists’ methods will not change (Galbraith, 2009; Colander, 2010; Shiller, 
2010; Shiller and Shiller, 2011). Attention needs to be focused on the role and 
composition of both funding bodies and research audit panels that currently favour 
quantitative research over historical, institutional, and discursive analysis, thereby 
influencing the career choices of aspiring professional economists. Arguably, 
economics is fundamentally a pluralist endeavour, and this should be adequately 
reflected (Hodgson, 2009; Earl, 2010). Logically, teaching at both the undergraduate 
and postgraduate levels is likely to be affected by such changes, although the 
introduction and mass adoption of textbooks incorporating competing views of the 
economy remains difficult to imagine. Nevertheless, in the words of Robert Shiller 
(2010: 407), we should “tell the truth about the weaknesses of our theories to our 
students.”  
Conclusion 
The global financial crisis of 2008 has led many economists to re-examine the 
foundations and teaching of the discipline. Most criticisms of the dismal science had 
                                                 
11 Peter Earl (2010) argues that behavioural economics and finance are but a first and partial step 
in this direction.  
9 
 
been voiced before the crisis, but the dramatic events of last few years have brought 
them back to the centre stage. One interesting aspect of the current debate is that it 
reveals the institutional structure of the discipline. Indeed, the suggested reforms are 
unlikely to succeed within the present system, given its bias toward one type of 
worldview and one type of methodology at the expense of other possibilities. These and 
other considerations are behind the creation, in October 2009, of the Institute for New 
Economic Thinking (INET) with a $50 million pledge from financier George Soros, 
who’s plea for a “new paradigm for financial markets” (Soros, 2008) now extends into 
all branches of economics.12 INET’s already well-oiled research grant programme has 
begun to initiate the desirable changes. The effects of these efforts, however, will take 
time to assess. Additional initiatives similar to INET would certainly accelerate the 
process.  
In the meantime, the profession would do well to accept one of the main messages 
conveyed in Hayek’s (1975: 433) Nobel Memorial Lecture, namely that it is perhaps 
preferable to possess “true but imperfect knowledge, even if it leaves much 
indetermined and unpredictable, to a pretence of exact knowledge that is likely to be 
false.” Much of the current impasse in modern economics stems from precisely the 
opposite belief.  
 
 
 
                                                 
12 See www.ineteconmics.org.  
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